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BACK TO BASICS FOR THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT 
by Lance Com pa 
The CIO Southern Organizing Com-
mittee is making splendid, if not 
altogether miraculous progress in the 
conduct of the campaign. We didn't go 
into the South to organize the South in-a 
few months. Oh no! Oh no/ No. we 
went in the South to stay in the South 
until. the job of organizing is com-
pleted, and if it is not completed in the 
year 1946 we will carry on in 1947 and 
1948 if need be. , . 
—CIO President 
Philip Murray, 1946 
Over thirty years ago, dra-matic union organizing vic-
tories at two- strongholds of 
southern anti-unionism, Cone Tex-
tile Mills in Greensboro and R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 
prompted.Phillip. Murray's burst of 
optimism. In the next few years, 
Murray predicted, labor would 
bring down the house of resistance 
and-win.the South, and he named 
labor's next-target: Cannon Mills 
in Kannapolis. 
Thirty-five: years later, splendid 
prdgress is still being made. In 
1980, union organizers have hailed . 
the Steel Workers'- contract for 
15,000 workers at the big Newport 
News shipyard, and the settlement 
of the long dispute between 5,000 
workers represented by the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Tex-
tile. Workers (ACTWU) and J. P. 
Stevens- as. the newest break-
throughs. They represent, as one 
union official put it, a double-
barrelled "shot -in the arm for 
organizing in the South." 
In this spir i t of optimism 
ACTWU has announced its next 
target—Cannon Mills in Kanna-
polis. 
Lance Compa .has been a union staffer and 
organizer for eight years. 
Rank and file 
militance is key. 
Does labor 
want it? 
The resurrection of Cannon 
Mills illustrates just how frus-
trating and elusive union organiz-
ing victories can be. Despite occa-
sional breakthroughs, southern 
organizing hasn't advanced much 
since. 1946. The South and 
Southwest remain the least 
unionized regions of the country. 
Elsewhere, union strength is 
plainly eroding. Union , member-
ship has taken a; slow but steady 
dip from. 36. percent..in the mid-
1950s to some. 22 percent, today. In 
.1977, union.success.in-NLRB elec-
tions. fell to:-an .historic low and 
: unions-.now :maintain-:only a 45 per-
cent victory rate. To make, matters 
worse,, "decertification" elections 
to vote _out an' incumbent, have 
risen from a.relatively stable 200 
per year in the 1950s and 1960s to a 
startling 80.0 per year in the late 
1970s. 
Observers have predicted the 
labor• movement's demfse before: 
"American trade unionism is slow-
ly being limited by changes which 
destroy the basis on which it is 
erected. . . . I see no reason to 
believe that American trade union-
ism will so revolutionize itself with-
in a short period of time as to 
become in the .next decade a more 
potent social influence than it has 
been in the past decade." 
George E. Barnet wrote that only 
one year before the San Francisco 
and Minneapolis general strikes of 
1934. The next year, Toldeo elec-
trical workers and Akron rubber 
workers staged sit-down strikes, 
and then in 1936-37 organizing 
drives swept the steel, electrical, 
auto, and rubber industries as well 
as other mass production indus-
tries, and 6 million workers joined 
the newly formed Congress of 
Industrial Organizations; Alto-
gether, American union member-
ship more than tripled in the 1935-. 
45 decade and when the AFL and 
CIO merged in 1955, 14 million 
workers were in the federation. 
Today, however, most union 
leaders are hardly sanguine about 
the future. Companies are esca-
lating their anti-union offensive. 
Technological change, growth in 
the service sectors and high tech 
sectors of the economy, overseas 
investment, plant shutdowns, and 
•runaway shops dilute labor's 
strength. Without massive new 
. organization, the labor movement 
will be pushed to the fringes of the 
economy and the government. 
TB"Tnion leaders have long recog-
^LJ nized that organizing is not 
merely a matter of acquiring more 
dues-paying members, but to 
increase public support and gain 
political power. Though employers, 
editors, professionals, politicians, 
preachers, . and even conservative 
AFL union officials railed against 
CIO organizing drives, .public 
sentiment nonetheless tilted toward 
workers who flocked into the new 
Auto Workers, Electrical Workers, 
Steel Workers , and Rubber 
Workers unions. 
Those organizing years pro-
duced a reservoir of good will 
despite disruptive tactics like sit-
ins, general strikes, and mass 
picketing. In those days, unions 
stood for change, progress, social 
justice, fair play—an image still 
associated with parts of the union 
movement. 
Despite labor's problems, opi-
nion polls still show that most 
Americans favor trade unions and 
collective bargaining. Norma . Rae 
owed much of its popularity to this 
reservoir of support for the under-
dog. So did the real-life Jh P. Stevens 
campaign.. 
Failure to organize has the oppo-
site effect. Unions then appear tobe 
narrow groups whose only purpose 
is to hang on to their privileges. 
They thus lose potential allies as 
well as potential members. 
Why are unions having such a 
hard time attractingnew members? 
At a time of serious crisis, why 
aren't workers responding to the 
call for collective strength?' The 
press constantly reports that union 
members earn more and get more 
ample wage increases than non-
union workers. Shouldn't the 
protection of a union contract bring 
in more union members'? 
In fact, many workers do seek 
union representation. But they face 
more sophisticated management 
opposition,' and a changed eco-
nomic environment. In the fifties. 
and sixties, the rapidly expanding;1 
economy allowed employers to 
adopt a' "we can live with them" 
attitude toward'unions. As long.as 
the unions joined in the Gold War 
and did not challenge the free 
enterprise system, com;pani:es 
prais.ed the virtues of collective bar-
gainingand the;"con3tructive" role 
of union-leadership. ! 
As the economic crisis developed 
in the 1970s-, employers have, how-" 
ever; reverted .to their historic 
antipathy toward unions. Their 
newly sophisticated opposition 
killed the-1978 Labor Law Reform' 
Bill, a mild measure that would 
have corrected.some of the more 
blatant abuses permitted by cur-
rent law. For example, deliberate 
delay of representation elections,' 
and frivolous appeals of union elec-
tion results were among the loop-
holes that allowed J. P. Stevens to 
stiff the Textile Workers for seven-
teen years. 
Now companies routinely hire 
union busting firms and anti-union 
labor lawyers to quash organizing 
drives. These consultants virtually 
take over day-to-day management 
of their employers' firms. They spy 
on employees, blacklist activists, 
screen future employees for union 
sympathies, enlist the aid of strike-
b r e a k e r s , and try to b r ibe 
employees and otherwise dissuade 
them from participating in organiz-
ing campaigns. (See Ron Chernow, 
"Gray Flannel Goons," Working 
Papers, January/February 1981.) 
What is worse, unions—them-
selves have inadvertently provided 
grist for union busters. When the 
unions accept wage concessions 
and can't halt plant closings and 
runaway shops in such highly 
organized industries as auto, truck-
ing, and steel, unorganized workers 
wonder how these mammoth 
unions will protect them. 
Furthermore, reports of union 
corruption far removed from the 
immediate organizing drives, such 
as the Teamsters' misuse of the 
Central States Pension Fund, 
undercuts campaigns: at hand, 
While employers have never hesi-
tated to exploit reports of union 
misdeeds, unions have not been.-
able to make corporate corruption 
an issue in organizing drives. 
Another obstacle to reorganizing 
is internecine warfare. While 
millions of unorganized workers 
languish, unions spend an enor-
mous amount of money and energy 
raiding one another's member-
ships. The Teamsters and the 
Machinists for example, are cur-
rently locked in bitter combat all 
across the country. Machinists' 
leaflets depict Teamster leaders as 
Mafia puppets, while Teamster 
fliers lampoon Machinists' President 
William Winpisinger. 
^gS^he situation would appear 
JIL very grim were it not for 
several new developments. Many 
unions have demonst ra ted a 
renewed commitment to organizing 
the unorganized by stepping up the 
pace of regional organizing confer-
ences, and by production of orga-
nizer training materials. They have 
hired, new organizers, from the 
ranks of union members, and hired 
young men and women trained in 
the community organizing and 
radical student movements of the 
1960s and 1970s. 
But what appears to be the really 
bright spot on the horizon is the 
.labor movement's willingness to 
experiment with innovative tech-
niques, that promise more effective 
organiz ing campaigns . Some 
unions, particularly in the building. 
trades, are planning to use pension 
fund investments as an organizing 
tool- by channeling money away 
from 'companies hostile to unions 
and toward companies that are 
more friendly. Other unions, like 
the Communications Workers of 
America, are bringing ...in., profes-
sional pollsters who promise to 
target critical issues and uncom-
mitted voters. The best known of 
these tactics is the "corporate cam-
paign," used by ACTWU to finally 
trying to cure it externally with. 
consultants largely fails to address 
the disease. I do not scorn these 
developments because they don't 
conform to some idealized notion of 
"shop floor, struggle." The forces 
lined up against workers trying to 
organize—employer power, weak 
labor, laws, union busting consul-
tants, anti-labor media, ."right-to-
work" groups, and so on—are so 
great that- pure syndicalism alone 
can rarely succeed' in building a 
union. The new organizing tech-
niques using lawyers, pension 
experts, pollsters, and public rela-
tions specialists may indeed be 
useful in supplementing a cam-
paign. However, by themselves or 
as a campaign's major feature, 
the.se techniques imply that 
workers are objects to be manipu-
lated, rather than people shaping 
their own working lives. 
The class consciousness and soli-
Only worker s actively pronto ting' 
fgthei^nnion 
fwpisltmate 
"force :i.J.B..J ;Stty?ens\-;ta; -tiie; .bar-
gainingvtable^"^ ^^:~l.^ii-"-':'\S^;:X' 
•, Developed by ^organizer- Ray. 
• Roger§-":who has since :opened;'h:is; 
ownoebnsulting1: firm,Jthe;qarnpaign:; 
was- -aftsystemat i t Sexploitation- fbf 
Stevens^ links in:,business^ barikirigi-
.and insurance- xirclesdPicfet: lines-. 
went up; ;ih:-frbht"of :New; 'York 
banks, :dissident-stockholders!:;rpse 
at annual;irneetings:'to denounce! 
Stevens, "experisive" Jproxy fights 
weremounteditpsostracize Stevens-
related;• directors..,of mother .corpo-.-
rations:.-;': - . ; ' ; ; ; ; ; ' • [ 
"
;
 All this- embarrassed Stevens in 
the. corporate community. Then. 
the threat of another directorship 
b a t t l e -at S tevens ' c r ed i to r 
Metropolitan Life, combined with 
. federal court rulings upholding 
pro-union NLRB decisions, helped 
pushithe company over the brink.to 
settlement.? .;• , ;::;, •'. 
Corporate, campaigns, however,. 
are double-edged. Tf labor is suf-
fering from rank-and-file inertia, 
Parity'neededsitpVbuildva;,union are 
^based^onTelationships.^among the 
iworkers^yyhb are organizing—their 
faithyn-pne anotherpcohfidence"in 
;;th!ef;leaders: among : them, their 
communication with each other, 
the actions they take together.. In a 
xush;:tb'.embrace:: innovative tech-
niques: best ihandled^byAiexperts, 
many .organizing campaigns have 
. a b a n d o n e d ; ^ 
;methods^thev.v.ery:;phes that give. 
wprkersi'aV taste-;ofu self-determi-
:natiori;:ani:self-corifidence; \l 
;: These ;.:methods: 'include': small-
group ::home meetings, . ipme visits 
witlv the union organizer, hand-to-
hand: distribution and face^to-face 
discussion .of union leaflets in the 
workplace; arguments with a fore-
man,' lunchroom speeches, plant 
gate!Tallies;, putting out ..a shop 
paper , ; ta lking with, already 
organized 'uunion,..members from 
otherHocals,€iplding:a union picnic, 
organizing .a. union softball team, 
and so forth. A patient four-year 
program of home visits by in-plant • 
organizers helped the Graphics 
Arts Union to organize the Krueger 
p r in t ing plant in Senatobia , 
Mississippi, in 1980. Women. 
assembly line organizers who con-
tradicted the supervisors' image of 
the company as "one big. happy 
family" helped the IBEW win the 
Sharpe electronics p lant in 
Memphis in early 1981. And even 
before the union won 'elections in 
the'late 1970s, ACTWU had built a 
virtual shop.steward system in the 
J.P. Stevens plants. 
In examining campaign results, 
most organizing losses can be 
traced to a failure to develop and 
apply these traditional methods. 
that are close to the workers' every-
day experience. When union staff 
organizers do little more than pass 
out sign-up cards at plant gates, 
puff up showcase contracts and 
arbitration awards and sit back and 
wait, they often lose elections. 
That's what happened when the 
Steel Workers tried to organize at 
the non-union Appliance Park 
East, General Electric's facility in 
Colombia, Maryland- Organizers 
photostated paychecks of steel-
workers working at the nearby 
Sparrows Point Bethlehem Steel 
plant and. ran pre-packaged radio 
advertisements boasting of union 
victories and high earnings. In spite 
of all the pro-union propaganda, 
the 1,200 employees voted two to 
one to stay non-union. 
Why? Because the in-plant 
organizing committee, though hard 
working, was just too small and iso-
lated ,.to_reach the majority of 
workers in assembly departments. 
Anonymous union propaganda 
packaged.by professionals was not 
able to counter the employer's face-
to-face anti-union campaign. Only 
workers actively promoting their 
union—rather than passively 
waiting for an election that will 
determine if they have a union— 
can convince their workmates that 
it's.worth.voting yes. 
Moreover, the "old-fashioned 
methods" are the very ones that put 
the conduct of a campaign into the • 
hands' of the workers themselves.-
They provide: concrete .tasks that 
allow workers to. actively shape 
their campaign. They force workers 
to develop a network of relations 
that cross the lines of race, sex, 
skill, age, and other divisions—divi-
sions that employers impose in the 
workplace, in the form of depart-
ments, shifts, job classifications, 
and pay scales. 
It takes years of work, and 
perhaps even' a series of election 
defeats to convince a majority of 
workers to stick with the union. 
Instead of dedicating the necessary 
time, and applying rank-and-file 
methods across the board, many 
union officials would rather score 
an occasional NLRB election vic-
tory by dazzling the opposition 
with innovation than dig. into the 
gritty, detailed work of a rank-and-
file campaign. 
But elections won with glossy PR 
often turn sour. Without a solid 
organizational base, unions are 
usually frustrated in negotiations 
on a first contract—the real test of 
whether workers have organized. 
For example, Vicki Saporta, a 
dynamic young Teamster orga-
nizer, swept the union to fiverapid-
fire organizing wins in • Davidson 
County, North Carolina, in 1978, 
attracting national attention in the 
process. When the dust settled and 
the time came to negotiate and 
enforce contracts, Saporta had 
been sent on to campaigns in other 
parts of the country.. Not sur-
prisingly, local Teamster officials 
couldn't consolidate the victories.. 
Without the months of,.patient, 
committee-building,.of. the,, day-to-.[ 
day confrontations with .manage.-,. 
ment that develop leaders .and 
leadership skills, fragile union 
structures collapsed. This May, 
. workers at Mallory Battery became 
the fourth of five plants to .decertify 
the Teamsters, by-a 481-228 vote. 
Only at PPG Industries is the 
union holding on (with the help of 
NLRB unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings). 
G iven this record, why are in-novative tactics so popular? 
Their popularity comes from, the 
estrangement of full-time union 
officials and organizers—them-
selves professionals—from the 
workers they want to organize. 
Although unions, gain much more 
than they lose from organizational 
stability reflected in experienced 
full-time leadership and staff, and 
most full-time trade unionists sin-
cerely want to help working 
people, the increasing profes-^ 
sionalization of trade union work. 
attracts leaders and staff toward 
other like-minded professionals. 
They are simply more compatible 
;in terms of .outlook, style, dis-
course, and often,standard of living. 
Union professionals often work 
behind the scenes with company 
executives to reach a settlement, 
by-passing a rank-and-file bar-
gaining committee. Top union 
• officers and staffers develop per-
sonal relationships with political 
operators, trading union endorse-
ments, support, and resources for 
political favors. 
This whole network of labor 
professionals—national union 
officers and staffers and high 
regional officials, union lawyers 
and consultants, "labor" politi-
cians and their aides—is also over-
whelmingly white and male. They 
enjoy a fraternal culture that shuts . 
out women and minority workers, 
who often make up a large part of 
the rank-andrrfile. Unless the.rank-
and-file are mobil ized, this 
patronizing attitude becomes the 
dominant one and can undermine 
the union's chances of success. 
When they exclude rank-and-file 
struggle, the innovations of the new 
organizing professionals, amount to 
:npthing more than ajazzed-up ver-
sion of the business unionism that 
has prevailed -since the CIO 
expelled its left wing in the red-
baiting purges of the late forties, 
and moved toward merger with the 
conservative AFL. Business union-
ists think members pay dues for 
services rendered. In the same way, 
they see workers in an organizing 
campaign not as protagonists in the 
struggle to organize, but as a 
chorus passing judgment on the 
marketing effectiveness of rival em-
ployer consultants and union pro-
fessionals. 
• As long as ,the new methods are 
treated as a supplement to' rank-
and-file organizing; i'they can 
contribute to organizing success. 
Some of their practitioners, like 
Ray Rogers of the Stevens corpo-
rate campaign, are.fully aware of 
this fact. The danger lies in a wide-
spread loss of perspective by.union 
officials and organizers so hungry 
for victories that they abandon 
rank-and-file methods in a rush to 
innovation. 
The real question behind the 
problem of organizing, in the 1980s 
is whether trade union leadership 
-really wants rank-and-file partici-
pation and control as the corner-
stone of an organizing movement. 
Of course, all unions want more 
members, but do they want a 
massive infusion of mobilized, 
aggressive workers who- will carry 
their experience of solidarity and 
struggle into the life of the union as 
well? This is the question that must 
be answered in the affirmative if the 
new interest in organizing the 
unorganized is-going to-lead, to a 
reversal of the.membership decline. 
If, rather than, addressing their own 
a t t i tude toward unorganized 
workers, the unions get side-
tracked into developing techniques 
to out-consult 'the consultants, the 
real opportunity will have been 
lost. • 
